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1. The seven signatory countries are: the United States, the Dominican Republic,
Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica.  The Dominican Republic
joined the agreement later than the other six countries; on March 15, 2004, it agreed to
become fully integrated into the Agreement by assuming the same general obligations and
commitments as CAFTA participants Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and
Nicaragua.  Office of the United States Trade Representative, Dominican Republic Advisory
Group Reports, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/DR_Reports/
Section_Index.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).  For the purposes of this Comment, the
Central America-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement will be referred
to as CAFTA.  The Agreement is not set out in the United States Code.  The Central
America-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act is
Pub. L. No. 109-53, 119 Stat. 462 (2005) see Short Title note set out under 19 U.S.C.A. §
4001 and Tables. For approval and entry into force of the Agreement, see 19 U.S.C.A. §
4011.  The full text of the Agreement can be seen at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_
Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DR_Final_Texts/Section_Index.html.
269
THE NEXT GENERATION OF CHILLING
UNCERTAINTY: INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION
UNDER CAFTA AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Benjamin W. Jenkins*
For centuries, the signatory countries of the Central America-
Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) have
been linked by the migratory patterns of their sea turtle populations.1  This
Comment proposes to use the sea turtle as a means of analyzing the CAFTA
agreement.  The goal is not simply to evaluate the potential effects of this
trade proposal on sea turtle populations, but rather to examine how the sea
turtle illuminates the unique challenges of protecting the natural
environment in this region.  In considering the challenges of creating
effective environmental protections in the Caribbean and Central America,
it is possible to forecast the potential impact of CAFTA’s environmental
and investor’s rights chapters.   
President George W. Bush stated the goals of CAFTA: “Open trade and
investment bring healthy, growing economies, and can serve the cause of
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2. CAFTA POLICY BRIEF, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, THE
CASE FOR CAFTA: GROWTH, OPPORTUNITY, AND DEMOCRACY IN OUR NEIGHBORHOOD
(Feb. 2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/
Briefing_Book/asset_upload_file235_7178.pdf.  For further language regarding the
overarching goals of the Agreement, see the Preamble to the text, available at http://www.
ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DR_Final_Texts/
asset_upload_file308_3917.pdf. 
3. See Elisabeth Malkin, Central American Trade Deal is Being Delayed by Partners,
N.Y. TIMES, March 2, 2006, at C10; CISPES, Violent Arrest of Union Activists Continues
Wave of Repression in El Salvador (July 21, 2006), http://www.cispes.org/index.php?
option=com_content&task=view&id=57&Itemid=28; Anti-CAFTA Protest Photos,
http://socialism.com/whatsnew/anticaftaprotestphotos.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).
4. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 [hereinafter NAFTA].  The NAFTA agreement is also available at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301-
3473 (2000).
democratic reform.  [With CAFTA][,] our purpose is to strengthen the
economic ties we already have with these nations . . . to reinforce their
progress toward economic, political and social reform.”2  Although CAFTA
did not draw much attention from the mainstream media in the United
States, it created widespread protest in the other six signatory countries.3
The Agreement is similar in many regards to the North American Free
Trade Agreement4 (NAFTA) signed by the United States, Mexico, and
Canada in 1994; an analysis of NAFTA ten years after implementation is
a useful tool to examine the potential effects of CAFTA.  Additionally, the
Harken Oil case, in which Costa Rica’s efforts to protect the Talamanca
coast ecosystem were challenged by an international oil company, offers an
opportunity to apply the environmental and investment language of CAFTA
to a real-world scenario in order to understand its potential impact on the
protection of the marine environments of the region.  This Comment
maintains that, while CAFTA contains language that superficially addresses
the issue of environmental protection, the underlying heart of the
Agreement ultimately could hinder efforts to protect the natural
environment in Central America. 
I.  SEA TURTLE SPECIES IN NORTH AMERICA
A.  Why Sea Turtles?
This Comment focuses on sea turtles because of their multi-faceted
importance in the greater Caribbean ecosystem.  Sea turtle meat and eggs
are a source of food, their shells are a traditional trade commodity, they are
an important cultural symbol, they attract thousands of tourists to the region
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5. MARCO SOLANO ET AL., INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION AND
CONSERVATION OF SEA TURTLES (IAC): AN INTRODUCTION 4 (Sept. 2004), available at
http: / /www.iacseaturt le.org/ iacseatur t le /Engl i sh /download/The%20Inter-
American%20Convention-%20An%20Introduction%20(hi%20res).pdf.
6. IUCN Red List of Threatened Species: Database Search,
http://www.iucnredlist.org/search/search-basic (last visited Feb. 11, 2007) (enter the
common name for each type of turtle).  The Pacific Ridley is also known as the Olive
Ridley.  
7. Id.  The Atlantic Ridley is also known as the Kemp’s Ridley, Gulf Ridley, and
Mexican Ridley.  
8. CITES, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243, Appendices I, II, and III
(June 26, 2006), http://www.cites.org/eng/app/appendices.pdf.  CITES works by placing
restrictions on the import or export of listed species.  Species listed in Appendix I are those
species threatened with extinction. Only in exceptional circumstances is trade in specimens
of these species permitted.  CITES, How CITES works, http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/
how.shtml (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).  All members of CAFTA are signatories to CITES.
CITES, Alphabetical List of Parties, http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/parties/alphabet.shtml
(last visited Feb. 11, 2007).
9. PETER PRITCHARD ET AL., GLOBAL STATUS OF MARINE TURTLES:  AN OVERVIEW 5
(2002), available at http://www.iacseaturtle.org/iacseaturtle/English/download/Condicion
GlobalTortugasMarinas_PritchardIngles.pdf. 
10. Id. A general overview of the life-cycle of a sea turtle is sufficient for the scope of
this paper.  
All sea turtles reproduce by way of internal fertilization.  After mating, the females
migrate toward their respective nesting beaches, generally the same beach where they
emerged as hatchlings.  Turtles may recognize their natal beaches by chemical
imprinting during the hatchling’s journey from the nest to the sea, or other unknown
mechanisms.  When the females are ready to nest, they emerge on tropical,
subtropical or temperate beaches, generally at night.  Using their flippers, they
prepare their nesting site by excavating a body pit to accommodate themselves in the
sand.  Later, they use their hind flippers to dig an egg chamber, where they will lay
annually, and they depend on some of the most biologically diverse and
threatened areas in the region for survival.  Additionally, their migration
patterns demand that conservation efforts coordinate local, national, and
international agreements.  
Six of the world’s seven species of sea turtles nest on beaches in North
and Central America and migrate through the coastal waters of the North
Pacific Ocean, North Atlantic Ocean, and Caribbean Sea.5  The Loggerhead,
Green turtle, and Pacific Ridley are listed as endangered species.6  The
Leatherback, Hawksbill, and Atlantic Ridley are listed as critically
endangered species.7  All six species are listed in Appendix 1 of the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora (CITES).8  The majority of population models are based on
counting nesting females;9 the life-cycle of a sea turtle, however, makes
estimating world-wide populations extremely difficult.10  Therefore, many
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between 50 and 200 eggs per nest, depending on the species.  Once the turtle has
finished laying her eggs, she fills in the nest chamber with sand.  With the possible
exception of the kemp’s ridley, female sea turtles do not reproduce every year; they
usually take between two to four years to return to nest.  The eggs will take between
45 and 75 days to hatch.  The sex of the hatchling is determined by the temperature
of the sand.  In general, warmer temperatures produce females and cooler
temperatures produce males.  It is believed that approximately one out of every 1,000
hatchlings that emerge will survive to maturity.  Hatchlings usually emerge from the
nest during the early evening or morning hours, immediately crawling seaward and
disappearing offshore where they begin swimming towards the open ocean and take
refuge in circular current systems.  They are not seen again until they have grown to
be much larger juveniles.  This largely unknown stage of sea turtle life history is
called the “lost years.”  Sea turtles reach sexual maturity between 10 and 50 years of
age, although this varies among species.  There is no way to determine the age of a
sea turtle by physical appearance; however, it is thought that some species may live
to be more than 100 years old.   
BELINDA DICK ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SEA TURTLES OF THE WORLD 4 (2004),
available at http://www.iacseaturtle.org/iacseaturtle/English/download/Introduction_
Sea_Turtles_World_ingl.pdf.
11. World Wildlife Fund, Endangered Species: Kemp’s ridley turtle,
http://www.panda.org/about_wwf/what_we_do/species/our_solutions/endangered_specie
s/marine_turtles/kemps_ridley_turtle/index.cfm?SID=34&LID=2&FH=E&SECTION=3
(last visited Feb. 11, 2007).
12. Id.
13. Id. 
14. World Wildlife Fund, Endangered Species: Hawksbill turtle,
http://www.panda.org/about_wwf/what_we_do/species/our_solutions/endangered_specie
s/marine_turtles/hawksbill_turtle/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 11, 2007) (an estimated decline
of eighty percent).  
15. World Wildlife Fund, Endangered Species: Leatherback turtle,
http://www.panda.org/about_wwf/what_we_do/species/our_solutions/endangered_specie
s/marine_turtles/leatherback_turtle/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 11, 2007) (a decline from
approximately 115,000 in 1982).  
organizations look to combine current estimates regarding world-wide
populations with historical, site-specific comparisons.  For example, esti-
mating the population size of the Atlantic Ridley is a manageable task
because of the smaller population and range of this species, and because this
turtle nests almost exclusively on a twenty kilometer section of beach in
Rancho Nuevo, Tamaulipas, Mexico.11  In film footage from 1947, an esti-
mated 40,000 females could be seen nesting in a single day; extrapolating
from this number, the population at that time was a few hundred thousand.12
In 1985, there were approximately 300 adult females, but now, the current
population stands at approximately 1700 adult females.13  The population
of nesting females for the other five species of marine turtle in the region
has been estimated as well:  Hawksbill—8000,14 Leatherback—34,000,15
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16. World Wildlife Fund, Endangered Species: Loggerhead turtle,
http://www.panda.org/about_wwf/what_we_do/species/our_solutions/endangered_specie
s/marine_turtles/loggerhead_turtle/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).
17. World Wildlife Fund, Endangered Species: Green turt le,
http://www.panda.org/about_wwf/what_we_do/species/our_solutions/endangered_specie
s/marine_turtles/green_turtle/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).
18. World Wildlife Fund, Endangered Species: Olive ridley turtle,
http://www.panda.org/about_wwf/what_we_do/species/our_solutions/endangered_specie
s/marine_turtles/olive_ridley_turtle/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).
19. World Wildlife Fund, Endangered Species: Marine Turtles,
http://www.panda.org/about_wwf/where_we_work/latin_america_and_caribbean/our_sol
utions/marine_turtle_programme/projects/leatherback_tracking_project/index.cfm (last
visited Feb. 11, 2007).
20. Caribbean Conservation Corporation & Sea Turtle Survival League, Sea Turtle
Migration-Tracking Education Program, http://www.cccturtle.org/satellitetracking.php (last
visited Feb. 11, 2007).
21. DICK ET AL., supra note 10, at 8.  Predation of adult sea turtles can be broken into two
categories: focused human fishing and other natural predators.  The effects of fishing and
bycatch will be discussed later in this Comment.  In general, as sea turtles physically grow
larger, threats from natural predation are reduced, but a small number of adult sea turtles are
killed each year by natural predators, namely, sharks.  Id.   
22. Id.  (dogs, pigs, various bird species, crabs, and raccoons all eat sea turtle eggs and
hatchlings).
Loggerhead—60,000,16 Green turtle—203,000,17 and Pacific Ridley—
800,000.18  In an effort to better understand sea turtles’ life-cycles and
population numbers, satellite tracking devices have been attached to several
individual Leatherbacks to monitor their migration patterns.19  Similar
efforts are underway to track Hawksbill, Loggerhead, Green, and Atlantic
Ridley turtles.20   
B.  Threats to Sea Turtle Populations
The specific threats to sea turtle populations in the region can be
roughly broken into the following groups: threats on shore during nesting,
threats to specific marine habitat, threats due to fishing, threats due to
incidental catch, and threats due to pollution.
1.  Predation
The impact of predation on sea turtle populations is most significant in
regard to the rates of mortality caused by natural predators, including
humans, hunting for sea turtle eggs and hatchlings.21  Sea turtle nests are
raided by many animals, and hatchlings are easy targets for these
predators.22  Humans also consume sea turtle eggs; many cultures in the
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23. Chris Hawley, Sex shells: Turtle lovers get racy for egg rescue, THE ARIZONA
REPUBLIC, Apr. 18, 2005, available at http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/
articles/0418seaturtles18.html.
24. SOLANO ET AL., supra note 5, at 8.
25. PRITCHARD ET AL.,  supra note 9, at 3.  Between 1970 and 1992, Japan imported
about thirty-three tons of Hawksbill shell per year, a total equivalent to the deaths of 31,000
turtles annually. World Wildlife Fund, Global Species Programme, http://www.panda.
org/about_wwf/what_we_do/species/our_solutions/endangered_species/marine_
turtles/hawksbill_ turtle/index.cfm?SID=33&LID=2&FH=E&SECTION=4 (last visited Feb.
11, 2007).  See also Caribbean Conservation Corporation & Sea Turtle Survival League,
Illegal harvest of nesting green turtles Chelonia mydas in Tortuguero National Park, Costa
Rica, http://www.cccturtle.org/ists/troeng-1998.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2007) (comparing
the effects of local consumption of the green turtle with the illegal harvest of the green turtle
for export to foreign markets).  A kilogram of uncrafted Hawksbill shell is worth thousands
of dollars.  DIDIHER CHACÓN-CHAVERRI, CARRIBEAN HAWKSBILLS- AN INTRODUCTION TO
THEIR BIOLOGY AND CONSERVATION STATUS 28 (2005), available at http://assets.panda.org/
downloads/monographcaribbean hawksbills.pdf.
26. SOLANO ET AL., supra note 5, at 7.
27. World Wildlife Fund, Global Species Programme, http://www.panda.
org/about_wwf/what_we_do/species/problems/fisheries_bycatch/index.cfm (last visited Feb.
11, 2007).  
region believe that such eggs act as an aphrodisiac, and hundreds of
thousands of eggs are stolen from nests each year.23  
2.  Fishing and Bycatch
In some areas of the region, turtles are targeted by fishermen for their
meat and shells.24  There is an interesting cultural and socio-economic
divide in the consumption of sea turtle meat and the use of sea turtle by-
products: many families in coastal communities in Central America and the
Caribbean eat sea turtle meat and there is also a lucrative overseas market
for turtle soup in England, turtle shells in Japan, and turtle leather in Italy.25
In addition to targeted fishing, the incidental capture of sea turtles on the
hooks and in the nets of fishing operations targeting other species is equally
problematic.26  Drift nets, shrimp trawlers, and gill nets all threaten sea
turtles by trapping and entangling them therein, causing them to drown.
The scope of the problem is demonstrated in an examination of the bycatch
impact on two species: “[m]ore than 250,000 loggerhead and leatherback
marine turtles are caught annually by commercial longline fisheries.”27  
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28. SOLANO ET AL., supra note 5, at 9.
29. Id. at 9.  “As with other sea turtle species, higher incubating temperatures favor the
production of females.”  DIDIHER CHACÓN-CHAVERRI, SYNOPSIS OF THE LEATHERBACK SEA
TURTLE 6 (2004), available at http://www.iacseaturtle.org/iacseaturtle/English/download/
INF-16-04%20eng.pdf.
30. World Wildlife Fund, MesoAmerican Reef 1, http://assets.panda.org/downloads/
mesoamericanreef.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).
31. Id.  The ecosystems of the MesoAmerican reef include “some of the most diverse
coral reefs in the western Atlantic in barrier and fringing reefs, atolls and patch corals,
lagoons, sea grass beds, and mangrove systems - all providing critical habitats for threatened
species and supporting thousands of coastal communities in both food security and
livelihoods.”  Id.
32. World Wildlife Fund, Greater Antilles Marine Ecosystem 1, http://assets.panda.org/
downloads/antillescoral.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).  
An extravagant variety of life relies on the region’s rich marine ecosystems - some
6,000 species in the Florida Keys alone.  Stoplight parrotfish, clown wrasse, and
Nassau grouper join the humpback whale and other endangered species such as the
West Indian dugong (manatee) and the marine turtle . . . .  Important migratory fish,
including tuna and sharks, move through the waters, while Cuban and American
crocodiles inhabit the coastal margins.  And thousands of migratory birds - from
flamingoes to white-tailed tropicbirds to black-capped petrels - make their temporary
or permanent homes here.  
Id.
3.  Beach Habitat Destruction
Human development and traffic along coastal property has had a
destructive effect on sea turtles’ ability to nest.28  Physical structures can
prevent access to beaches and change erosion patterns; artificial lighting can
disorient sea turtle hatchlings; automobile traffic on the beach can compact
sand preventing female turtles from digging nests and hatchlings from
leaving a nest; and the increased shade or sun on a beach can distort sea
turtle hatchlings’ gender ratio.29 
4.  Marine Habitat Destruction
The sea turtle populations in North America, Central America, and the
Caribbean are a part of two key ecological areas: the MesoAmerican Reef
and the Greater Antilles Reef.  The MesoAmerican Reef stretches from
Mexico’s Yucatan Peninsula, past Belize and Guatemala to the Northern
coast of Honduras.30  This reef system provides feeding areas for the Green,
Hawksbill, and Loggerhead turtles, as well as hundreds of other species,
and is the economic center for many coastal communities.31  The Greater
Antilles Reef is composed of a series of three island chains that are centrally
located in an ecosystem that extends over seventy million square kilo-
meters.32  
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33. SOLANO ET AL., supra note 5, at 9.
34. Id. at 10.  “The ingestion of plastic or entanglement in netting, cords or other kinds
of wastes, can cause flotation problems, reduced mobility or the loss of extremities, which
can eventually lead to the death of the turtles.”  Id. 
35. For example, a well run beach protection program is essentially rendered useless if
all the hatchlings that reach adulthood are captured in driftnets offshore.  
36. This is not meant to be an exhaustive list of relevant conservation efforts; rather,
these agreements are to be used to illustrate ongoing efforts to create effective environmental
protection in the region.  
37. Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the
Wider Caribbean Region, Mar. 24, 1983, T.I.A.S. No. 11.085 [hereinafter Cartagena
Convention], available at http://www.cep.unep.org/pubs/legislation/cartxt.php. 
5.  Pollution
The introduction of pollutants, sediment, fertilizer, and other chemicals
into the marine environment, via runoff and discharge, negatively effects
sea turtle populations by destroying coral reef ecosystems, a critical sea
turtle habitat.33  Floating waste discarded into the ocean also has a
dangerous effect on sea turtle populations.  For example, sea turtles often
mistake floating plastic bags as jellyfish, a key component of many turtles’
diets, and eat the debris as it floats on the ocean surface.34
II.  THE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN MULTI-NATIONAL, NATIONAL, AND
LOCAL EFFORTS TO PROTECT SEA TURTLE POPULATIONS
Because of their life cycle and migration patterns, sea turtles require
local, national, and multinational cooperation in order to ensure proper
protection.35  In order to grasp the myriad agreements and programs aimed
at protecting sea turtles, it is useful to examine the connections between the
Cartagena Convention, the Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas
and Wildlife, the International Convention for the Protection and Conserva-
tion of Sea Turtles, and the Wider Caribbean Sea Turtle Conservation
Network.36  These agreements reflect the ongoing work in the wider
Caribbean region to create both a comprehensive, multinational program to
protect the marine environment, and also to encourage small-scale
organizations and local communities to create site-specific plans to protect
sea turtles.
The Cartagena Convention is the legal implementation of the Action
Plan for the Caribbean Environment Programme, signed on March 24,
1983, in Cartagena, Colombia.37  All CAFTA countries with coastline on
the Caribbean Sea have either signed or ratified the Cartagena Convention,
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38. Id. art. 2, ¶ 1.
39. United Nations Environment Programme, Factsheet: Specially Protected Areas and
Wildlife in the Wider Caribbean Region- A Regional Protocol on Biodiversity 1 (2006)
[hereinafter SPAW Factsheet], available at http://www.cep.unep.org/operational-
components/plonearticlemultipage.2005-10-03.4690343384/plonearticle.2005-10-
03.5299274574 (follow “SPAW Factsheet” hyperlink at bottom of page).  The convention
has twenty-one contracting parties of the possible twenty-eight states.  Of the CAFTA
nations, Nicaragua and Honduras have signed the Agreement but have not ratified it; the
remainder of the CAFTA nations have ratified the Agreement.  United Nations Environment
Programme, Convention and Protocols Status Page, http://www.cep.unep.org/law/
cartstatus.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).  El Salvador does not have a Caribbean coast and
is therefore not included in the Agreement.
40. SPAW Factsheet, supra note 39, at 1. 
which protects the marine environment within the “Gulf of Mexico, the
Caribbean Sea[,] and the areas of the Atlantic Ocean adjacent thereto, south
of 30 deg[rees] north latitude and within 200 nautical miles of the Atlantic
coasts of the States . . . of the Convention.”38  The Cartagena Convention is
the only legally binding environmental treaty for the wider Caribbean
region.39  It states that:
The Convention and its Protocols constitute a legal commit-
ment by these countries to protect, develop, and manage their
common coastal and marine resources individually and jointly.
The Cartagena Convention and its Protocols enhance not only
protection but also development, as specifically noted in its
provisions.  
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
each coastal country is responsible for managing the marine
environment of its territory.  Because of the large number of
countries in a relatively small area, almost the entire marine
environment of the WCR [Cartagena Convention] falls within one
exclusive economic zone or another, leaving management of these
areas under national jurisdiction.  Further, the ecological and
oceanographic interconnectivity of the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf
of Mexico is widely documented.  This situation exemplifies the
need for regional co-operation and coordination. 
Article 10 of the Cartagena Convention, requires Parties to take
“all appropriate measures” to protect and preserve “rare or fragile
ecosystems,” as well as the “habitats of depleted, threatened or
endangered species,” and, to this end, establish specially protected
areas.40
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41. The text of Article Ten:
The Contracting Parties shall, individually or jointly, take all appropriate measures
to protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems, as well as the habitat of depleted,
threatened or endangered species, in the Convention area. To this end, the
Contracting Parties shall endeavour to establish protected areas . . . .  In addition, the
Contracting Parties shall exchange information concerning the administration and
management of such areas.  
Cartagena Convention, supra note 37, art. 10.
42. Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife to the Convention for
the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region,
Jan. 18, 1990, available at http://www.cep.unep.org/pubs/legislation/spaw.html [hereinafter
SPAW].
43. Id.
44. Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles,
About  the  Convent ion  [hereinafter  In ter -American  Convent ion] ,
http://www.iacseaturtle.org/iacseaturtle/English/acerca.asp (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).  
45. Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles,
In order to further the goals of Article Ten of the Cartagena Conven-
tion,41 the member nations adopted a protocol on Specially Protected Areas
and Wildlife (SPAW).42  The purpose of this 1991 protocol is to protect,
preserve, and manage in a sustainable way: 1) areas and ecosystems that
require protection to safeguard their special value; 2) threatened or
endangered species of flora and fauna and their habitats; and 3) species with
the objective of preventing them from becoming endangered or threatened.43
The cooperation between worldwide and regional environmental
treaties leads to a more comprehensive and consistent approach to
ecosystem protection.  This has resulted in regional, species-specific
programs created to protect sea turtles in the wider Caribbean region.  One
such example is the Inter-American Convention for the Protection and
Conservation of Sea Turtles (IAC).44  The IAC is:
[A]n intergovernmental treaty which provides the legal
framework for countries in the American Continent to take actions
in benefit of these species.  The IAC entered into force in May of
2001 and currently has eleven Contracting Parties, in addition to
two countries awaiting national ratification. 
The Convention promotes the protection, conservation and
recovery of the populations of sea turtles and those habitats on
which they depend, on the basis of the best available data and
taking into consideration the environmental, socioeconomic and
cultural characteristics of the Parties (Article II, Text of the
Convention).  These actions should cover both nesting beaches and
the Parties’ territorial waters.45
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Introduction, http://www.iacseaturtle.org/iacseaturtle/English/home.asp (last visited Feb. 11,
2007).  
The history of the IAC is as follows:
In 1994, recognizing the regional nature of the threats to sea turtle survival, the
nations of the western hemisphere began a collaborative effort to negotiate an
agreement for the future of these species.
In 2001, with the ratification of the eighth nation, the Inter-American
Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles entered into force. The
Convention attends to the need for implementation of harmonious measures between
nations, multilateral coordination of conservation and protection actions, and
oversight of the implementation of a regional agenda that will enable the recovery of
these species.
Inter-American Convention, supra note 44.
46. United Nations Environment Programme, WIDECAST and SPAW,
http://grid2.cr.usgs.gov/cepnet/programmes/spaw/widecast.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).
WIDECAST involves the “direct involvement of resident scientists, conservationists,
enforcement officers, policy-makers, fishermen, teachers and others” in an attempt to create
a conservation plan that is not only biologically sound, but also accurately reflects the needs
of local communities.  Id.
47. For a somewhat dated overview of the location and status of existing MPAs in the
Caribbean, including a map, see Australian Dept. of the Environment and Heritage, Global
Representative System of Marine Protected Areas, Marine Region 7: Wider Caribbean
(1995), available at http://www.deh.gov.au/coasts/mpa/nrsmpa/global/volume2/chapter7.
html; and TIGHE GEOGHEGAN ET AL., CHARACTERIZATION OF CARIBBEAN MARINE
PROTECTED AREAS: AN ANALYSIS OF ECOLOGICAL, ORGANIZATIONAL, AND SOCIO-
ECONOMIC FACTORS (2001), available at http://www.canari.org/thacker.pdf.
A second example of species-specific conservation efforts is the Wider
Caribbean Sea Turtle Conservation Network (WIDECAST).  WIDECAST
provides a forum for collaborative conservation action regarding the six
species of sea turtle in the region, and focuses on local ecosystems and site-
specific solutions by incorporating the input of all interested parties.46  
The connection between the Cartegena Convention and ground-level
conservation efforts supported by groups such as WIDECAST demonstrates
the successful top to bottom integration needed to protect migratory species,
such as sea turtles.  However, this is only the first step in protecting the
marine environment; the next critical phase is full enforcement of these
existing regulations and the creation of more comprehensive protection.
For example, the creation of effective Marine Protected Areas (MPAs)
around critical marine habitats would be a tremendous step towards
stabilizing the sea turtle populations in the region.47  Nevertheless, increased
enforcement and the creation of new, expansive laws to protect the marine
environment are two types of measures that will most likely be negatively
impacted by CAFTA.  
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48. Statement of USTR Stephen Norton Regarding CAFTA-DR Implementation (Dec.
30, 2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2005/
December/Statement_of_USTR_Spokesman_Stephen_Norton_Regarding_CAFTA-
DR_Implementation.html.
49. Statement of USTR Susan C. Schwab Regarding Entry Into Force of the CAFTA-DR
for Guatemala (June 30, 2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/
Press_Releases/2006/June/Statement_of_USTR_Susan_C_Schwab_Regarding_Entry_Int
o_Force_of_the_CAFTA-DR_for_Guatemala.html.  The United States Senate passed the
implementing legislation in June 2005, and the House of Representatives in July 2005, and
President Bush signed the Agreement in August 2005.  As of July 1, 2006, El Salvador,
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala had fully implemented the Agreement.  Id.
50. CAFTA POLICY BRIEF, supra note 2.  This Brief states that “nearly 80% of products
from Central America and the Dominican Republic already enter the U.S. duty-free . . .
America’s market is already open.”  Id. 
51. Rob Portman, Why Fear CAFTA?, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2005, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Op-eds/2005/Why_Fear_CAFTA.html.
The relative bargaining power between the United States and the six other signatories
has been a source of concern as CAFTA has moved toward full implementation.  The fact
that the U.S. is such an unequal trading partner with the six other signatories of CAFTA
raises the question of the equity of the content of the Agreement. The relative bargaining
power of each signatory can be roughly examined by an analysis of each country’s per capita
Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  United States $43,500, Costa Rica $12,000, Dominican
Republic $8,000, El Salvador $4,900, Guatemala $4,900, Honduras $3,000, Nicaragua
$3,000.  CIA, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/
rankorder/2004rank.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).  In 2003, it took the United States
economy approximately five days to produce the combined GDP of Costa Rica, Honduras,
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.  PUBLIC CITIZEN’S GLOBAL TRADE WATCH,
CAFTA BY THE NUMBERS: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 1 (July 2004), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/CAFTAbyNumbers.pdf.
III.  THE CENTRAL AMERICA- DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-UNITED STATES
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
The seven signatory countries to CAFTA established a target date of
January 1, 2006, for full implementation of the Agreement.48  As of June 30,
2006, all countries except Costa Rica ratified the Agreement, and each
signatory country is currently in the process of completing internal
procedures to complete full implementation.49  A CAFTA policy brief,
produced by the Office of the United States Trade Representative, states
that the United States exports over fifteen billion dollars annually to the
CAFTA region, and that the Agreement will “level the playing field for
U.S. workers” by allowing U.S. products, services, and farm products to
enter the region without duties or tariffs.50  Once CAFTA is fully
implemented, the United States would save “nearly $1 billion per year in
foreign taxes on . . . manufactured goods and farm products.”51 
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52. CAFTA art. 17.1.
53. CAFTA art. 17.1.a.
54. CAFTA art. 17.7.
55. CAFTA POLICY BRIEF, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
ENVIRONMENTAL FIRSTS IN CAFTA (Feb. 2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/
Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/Briefing_Book/asset_upload_file601_7194.pdf. 
56. CAFTA art. 17.12.
57. CAFTA art. 17.2.1.a.
A.  Key Provisions of CAFTA
For the purposes of this Comment, the two key provisions of the
CAFTA agreement are Chapter Seventeen: Environment, and Chapter Ten:
Investment.  
1.  Chapter Seventeen:  Environment
Chapter Seventeen first outlines the levels of environmental protection
expected of each member, stating that each country has the right “to
establish its own levels of domestic environmental protection[,] . . .
encourage high levels of environmental protection, and . . . strive to
continue to improve those laws and policies.”52  Regarding the enforcement
of environmental protection, Chapter Seventeen states that “[a] Party shall
not fail to effectively enforce its environmental laws.”53  This Chapter
includes a public submissions process,54 which is designed to “create an
important new avenue for civil society to raise specific problems associated
with enforcement of environmental laws.”55  This Chapter also recognizes
the role of multilateral environmental agreements “in protecting the
environment globally and domestically.”56  
a.  A Critical Reading of Chapter Seventeen
CAFTA does not require any member country to adopt or maintain any
environmental laws or regulations; rather, it creates largely unenforceable
suggestions.  Article 17.10.7 provides that the only provision of Chapter
Seventeen that is subject to any level of enforcement via dispute resolution
is Article 17.2.1.a, which demands that “[a] Party shall not fail to
effectively enforce its environmental laws, through a sustained or recurring
course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the Parties,
after the date of entry into force of this Agreement.”57  This enforceability
relates only to environmental laws that are already in existence, and the
terms “sustained or recurring course of action or inaction” imply that a
single event of environmental destruction would not trigger the enforcing
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58. CAFTA art. 20.17.2.
59. CAFTA art. 17.2.1.b.
60. CAFTA art. 17.3.6.
61. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, INTERIM ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW,
U.S.-CENTRAL AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 31 (Aug. 2003), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/asset_upload_file946_3
356.pdf.
62. Id.
63. JOHN AUDLEY & VANESSA ULMER, STRENGTHENING LINKAGES BETWEEN U.S.
TRADE POLICY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CAPACITY BUILDING 16 (July 2003), available at
www.ceip.org/files/pdf/wp40.pdf.
64. Open Letter from the Sierra Club to Congress re: Oppose the Central American Free
Trade Agreement (Apr. 13, 2005), available at http://www.sierraclub.org/trade/
cafta/cafta_letter.asp.
language.  Any fines associated with this enforceable provision have an
annual limit of fifteen million dollars.58  In addition, this enforceable
provision is contradicted by two subsequent sections of Chapter Seventeen:
CAFTA allows countries “the right to exercise discretion with respect to
investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance matters,”59 and
there is no level of inquiry regarding the judicial enforcement of the afore-
mentioned environmental laws: “nothing in this Chapter shall be construed
to call for the examination under this Agreement of whether a Party’s
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative tribunals have appropriately
applied that Party’s environmental laws.”60
Even if strong enforcement language existed in Chapter Seventeen, the
fact that only existing environmental laws fall under the Agreement means
that there is currently very little to enforce.  For example, “Guatemala has
not passed a wide spectrum of environmental laws, and lacks specific laws
dealing with the major issues of water, forests, solid wastes, [and]
biodiversity,”61 and “Honduras also has a more limited slate of domestic
environmental legislation.”62  In countries with more extensive environ-
mental laws on the books, the enforcement of such laws is often lax:
“[a]lthough the Central Americans are making progress toward designing
and implementing effective environmental laws, the United States is already
aware these laws may not yet be adequate and certainly are not well
enforced.  Asking a country with weak enforcement capability to enforce
(perhaps) insufficient laws means little in terms of real environmental
protection.”63  The much touted citizen submission procedure does not
create any clear results from such a submission: “[t]he citizen submission
process’ lack of enforcement tools contrasts starkly with the monetary
compensation that private investors can demand of governments under
CAFTA’s investor rights rules.”64  CAFTA’s Chapter Seventeen creates no
new environmental provisions; rather it limits the means of enforcing
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65. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SECTION BY SECTION
SUMMARY OF THE CAFTA 12, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/
Bilateral/CAFTA/Briefing_Book/asset_upload_file128_7284.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).
66. CAFTA art. 10.28.
67. CAFTA art. 10.7.1.
existing environmental laws, and it provides no meaningful way to monitor
the national enforcement of those existing limited environmental laws.
Practically, this means that the creation of new, significant environmental
protections (for example, large scale MPAs) becomes less likely, and the
enforcement of the few laws protecting sea turtles and their habitat is
potentially more difficult.  
2.  Chapter Ten:  Investment
The fact that CAFTA has under-realized its potential to act as a vehicle
for comprehensive, regional environmental protection is certainly
disappointing.  The more damaging reality of the Agreement, however, is
Chapter Ten, the investment portion of CAFTA.  The stated purpose of
Chapter Ten is to establish “rules to protect investors from one Party against
unfair or discriminatory government actions when they make or attempt to
make investments in another Party’s territory.”65  Investment is defined as
“every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has
the characteristics of an investment, including such characteristics as the
commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit,
or the assumption of risk.”66  The language protecting the expropriation of
a covered investment is of particular importance to this Comment:
No Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment
either directly or indirectly through measures equivalent to
expropriation or nationalization (“expropriation”) except: (a) for a
public purpose; (b) in a non-discriminatory manner; (c) on payment
of prompt, adequate and effective compensation . . . and (d) in
accordance with due process of law and Article 10.5.67  
An indirect expropriation is defined as:
[A]n action or series of actions by a Party has an effect equivalent
to direct expropriation without formal transfer of title or outright
seizure. 
(a) [t]he determination of whether an action or series of
actions by a Party, in a specific fact situation, constitutes
an indirect expropriation, requires a case-by-case, fact-
based inquiry that considers, among other factors: 
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68. CAFTA Annex 10-C.4.
69. CAFTA art. 10.7.2.  Other public policy regulations, such as safety, health, or labor
laws, would be impacted in a similar manner.  
70. CAFTA art. 10.11 (emphasis added).
71. CAFTA Annex 10-C(4)(b) (emphasis added).
72. CAFTA art. 10.15.
73. CAFTA arts. 10.16, 10.19.  By signing CAFTA, “[e]ach Party consents to the
submission of a claim to arbitration under this Section in accordance with this Agreement.”
CAFTA art. 10.17.
74. CAFTA art. 10.20.3.  The NAFTA tribunal process, which is the model for the
CAFTA procedure, has been roundly criticized for its lack of transparency.  See Anthony
DePalma, NAFTA’s Powerful Little Secret: Obscure Tribunals Settle Disputes, but Go Too
Far, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, at Section 3.    
(i) the economic impact of the government action,
although the fact that an action or series of actions by
a Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of
an investment, standing alone, does not establish that
an indirect expropriation has occurred; 
(ii) the extent to which the government action interferes
with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions; and 
(iii) the character of the government action.68
For example, an environmental law that limits an investor’s expectation
of gain or profit could be viewed as being equivalent to expropriation and
thus require compensation to the investor equivalent to the “fair market
value of the expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation
took place.”69  The Agreement does state that “[n]othing in this Chapter
shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining, or
enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it
considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is
undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns.”70  Addition-
ally, the Agreement states, “[e]xcept in rare circumstances, non-
discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied
to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety,
and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations.”71  
Should an investment dispute arise, the claimant and respondent are
directed to “resolve the dispute through consultation and negotiation.”72
Should such methods fail, one party may submit to arbitration before a three
person, private tribunal.73  This private tribunal “shall have the authority to
accept and consider amicus curiae submissions from a person or entity that
is not a disputing party.”74  No deference is given to legislative judgments
or local courts; there is no check on the authority of the tribunals to ensure
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75. The governing law to be applied in a dispute is to be “in accordance with [CAFTA]
and applicable rules of international law.”  CAFTA art. 10.22.1.  Specific rules of law are
used when the dispute involves an investment agreement or investment authorization.
CAFTA art. 10.22.2.
76. Article 10.7, the expropriation requirement, contains the most potentially problematic
language of Chapter Ten.  The Investment Chapter also includes requirements regarding:
national treatment (art. 10.3), most favored nation treatment (art. 10.4), minimum standard
of treatment in accordance with international law (art. 10.5), and prohibitions on certain
types of performance requirements (art. 10.9).
77. Imagine a signatory country wanting to protect a portion of its coastline from oil
exploration in order to protect a particularly important portion of marine habitat.  Under
CAFTA, the worry of a multi-million or multi-billion dollar claim could be enough to
prevent the creation of such an MPA.  See infra, notes 124-28 and accompanying text.  
78. Howard Mann & Konrad von Moltke, NAFTA’s Chapter 11 and the Environment,
Addressing the Impacts of the Investor-State Process on the Environment, Working Paper
5 (1999), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/nafta.pdf.
A quick overview of the historical underpinnings of investor-to-state dispute
resolution: 
[D]isputes were commonly waged between states because private investors
lacked standing under international law.  If private investors sought action against a
foreign state, the investors had to rely on their home governments to bring the claim
in accordance with an international dispute resolution treaty, assuming the two
countries were a part of a bilateral or multilateral agreement. Unfortunately for
that their personal values are not being applied to disputes between
investors and states.75  
a.  A Critical Reading of Chapter Ten
The expansive definition of “investment,” the uncertain boundaries of
indirect expropriation, and the lack of deference given to domestic law all
place an immense amount of power in the hands of the private tribunal and
create uncertainty for the governments of the signatory nations.76  The fact
that foreign investors can bypass domestic courts and challenge a country’s
environmental laws in front of a CAFTA tribunal threatens the role of
democratic governance, despite the rhetoric surrounding the Agreement
claiming that CAFTA will strengthen the delicate democracies of the
region.  The mere threat of such lawsuits could undermine the development
of needed environmental laws; this chilling effect caused by the uncertainty
of the interpretation of the expropriation language could effectively prevent
governments from creating and enforcing effective measures for the public
interest.77 
Historically, the creation of investor-state protections and potential
remedies were designed to oppose “arbitrary and unreasonable government
actions against foreign companies.”78  This protection is critical to foreign
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investors, the home government was under no obligation to bring the claim, and few
investors were able to obtain relief. This lack of representation for private investors
was one of the biggest reasons why NAFTA included Chapter 11 [and CAFTA
included Chapter 10] investor-to-state dispute resolution. Too often under the old
system investors had no recourse, so Chapter 11 was created to act as a “shield” for
foreign investors who needed a mechanism to protect their interests from host nations.
Ray C. Jones, NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-to-State Dispute Resolution: A Shield to be
Embraced or a Sword to be Feared?, 2002 B.Y.U. L. REV. 527, 529 (2002) (internal
citations omitted).
The historical stance of the United States regarding expropriation:
[T]he debate over the international law standard governing expropriation has been
rooted in North American politics since at least the beginning of the twentieth
century.  In 1915, Mexico began nationalizing private property belonging to U.S.
citizens. Mexico maintained that they had a right under international law to deny
compensation for “expropriations of a general and impersonal character.”  The United
States however, supported the Hull Doctrine, named after Secretary of State Cordell
Hull, which asserts: “no government is entitled to expropriate private property; for
whatever purpose, without provision for prompt, adequate, and effective payment
therefor [sic].”
Jeffrey Turk, Compensation for “Measures Tantamount to Expropriation” Under NAFTA:
What it Means and Why it Matters, 1 INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 41, 42-43 (2005) (internal
citations omitted).  
79. Jones, supra note 78, at 531.
80. MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 78, at 6.  
81. The investor-state process is based on a commercial model of arbitration, which
makes for a particularly poor fit when considering issues of public policy.  This model of
investors who must adhere to a host country’s laws, but do not have the
traditional access to the political process of the host country.79  This
traditional concept of a legal shield to protect foreign investors has shifted,
and language incorporated in Article 10.7 creates a sword for foreign
investors; this enables investors to protect themselves “from the adoption
of new laws or policies that would have an economic impact on them.  This
strategic development has changed, and arguably misappropriated, the
investor-state provisions from their traditional role as a defensive investor
protection mechanism to a potent offensive strategic tool.”80  The concept
behind allowing an investor to challenge a government action in an
independent tribunal is the presumption that such an investor might not
receive fair treatment in the domestic court system of that country.  By
creating a private tribunal, investors will be presented with more certainty
regarding the adjudication they receive.  However, allowing this shield to
be wielded as a sword, especially when the government action is the
creation and implementation of public policy measures, cuts in the opposite
direction, which creates uncertainty for the state and threatens the public
good.81
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arbitration has traditionally been: 
[H]eld between private sector litigants, these types of international or domestic
commercial arbitrations commonly deal with private matters of a commercial nature.
As commercial issues began to arise between corporations and foreign governments,
the procedures were adapted to accommodate this new development . . . .  [The
expropriation language] has gone well past private commercial issues to include any
type of public policy or public welfare measure that might impact on the
establishment, operation, management, control, or divestiture of a company.  
MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 78, at 50.
82. The polluter pays principle was developed by the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD); 
The principle to be used for allocating costs of pollution prevention and control
measures to encourage rational use of scarce environmental resources and to avoid
distortions in international trade and investment is the so-called “Polluter-Pays
Principle.” This principle means that the polluter should bear the expenses of carrying
out the above-mentioned measures decided by public authorities to ensure that the
environment is in an acceptable state. In other words, the cost of these measures
should be reflected in the cost of goods and services which cause pollution in pro-
duction and/or consumption. Such measures should not be accompanied by subsidies
that would create significant distortions in international trade and investment.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Recommendation of the Council
on Guiding Principles concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental
Policies, C(72)128, May 26, 1972.
83. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992, Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc A/CONF. 151/26 (Vol. I) (Aug.
12, 1992).
This inversion of the polluter pays principle has spawned a series of hypothetical
“perverse incentives;” for example, “companies may be more willing to market products that
entail potential health and safety concerns under NAFTA, knowing that if a state bans their
product, they will be compensated.”  Turk, supra note 78, at 70.  Another example would
be that “[allowing regulatory expropriations] may create an incentive to over-invest in areas
likely to be regulated in order to reap the full benefit of compensation.”  Joel C. Beauvais,
Regulatory Expropriations Under NAFTA: Emerging Principles & Lingering Doubts, 10
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 245, 282 (2002).
This idea of being awarded compensation based on indirect
expropriation, when the challenged state activity is an environmental
regulation, is in complete contrast to the “polluter pays principle.”82  This
concept has been recognized internationally: the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development states that “[n]ational authorities should
endeavor to promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use
of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter
should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution.”83  
Where to draw the line between a non-compensable government
regulation and a measure that triggers compensation under Article 10.7 is
extremely important to both governments and investors:
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84. J. Martin Wagner, International Investment, Expropriation and Environmental
Protection, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 465, 471-72 (1999) (quoting RUDOLF DOLZER &
MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 99-100 (1995)).  The goals of the
investor and state are often in opposition, but a balance must be maintained between the two
extremes:  “[a]n international community of investors may desire property rules and
practices of a clear and certain type.  But this desire cannot be allowed to overshadow the
equally legitimate claims of local communities to be able to renegotiate property practices
piecemeal, in appropriate circumstances, without undue constraint.”  Marc R. Poirier, The
NAFTA Chapter 11 Expropriation Debate Through the Eyes of a Property Theorist, 33
ENVTL. L. 851, 860 (2003).  
85. CAFTA Annex 10-C(3).
86. CAFTA Annex 10-C(4).
87. Poirier, supra note 84, at 859.
[T]o the investor, the line of demarcation between measures for
which no compensation is due and actions qualifying as indirect
expropriations [that require compensation] may well make the
difference between the burden to operate (or abandon) a non-
profitable enterprise and the right to receive full compensation
(either from the host State or under an insurance contract).  For the
host State, the definition determines the scope of the State’s power
to enact legislation that regulates the rights and obligations of
owners in instances where compensation may fall due.  It may be
argued that the State is prevented from taking any such measures
where these cannot be covered by public financial resources.84
B.  Police Power vs. Indirect Expropriation: International Perspectives
The issue at the heart of interpreting Article 10.7.1 is the distinction
between legitimate police power regulation, indirect expropriation, and
direct expropriation.  Direct expropriation is defined as when “an invest-
ment is nationalized or otherwise directly expropriated through formal
transfer of title or outright seizure.”85  Indirect expropriation is triggered
when a party’s action “has an effect equivalent to direct expropriation.”86
Direct expropriations are easy to identify and relatively easy to remedy:
“[t]he classic controversy occurs when one state nationalizes or expropriates
private property owned by a foreign investor.  The act of expropriation is
clear, the legal obligation to compensate is clear, and typically the only
difficult legal question is how to calculate compensation.”87  Indirect
expropriations, or regulatory expropriations, are difficult to both identify
and remedy: “[r]egulatory takings claims require contextual, essentially ad
hoc, fact-based determinations much of the time.  It seems to be impossible
to specify in a few words or sentences all the circumstances that go into our
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88. Id. at 859-60.  
89. The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is a collection of mostly pre-
existing customary law on how to create, interpret, and challenge treaties.  Because it was
considered to not be a change in existing international law, it, unlike most treaties, arguably
could be applicable to even non-parties, such as the United States.
90. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39/27 (1969), 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
91. Both CAFTA and NAFTA allow the application of international law when
interpreting and applying the language of the Agreements. CAFTA art. 1.2.2, NAFTA art.
1131(1).
sense of fairness and reasonableness when a property owner is affected by
regulation . . . .”88  An examination of international law can at the least
frame the interpretation of the indirect expropriation language of Article
10.7.1.  
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties89 provides a general rule
of interpretation:
1.  A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2.  The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and
annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made
between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the
treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in
connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by
the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3.  There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties.
4.  A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established
that the parties so intended.90
The terms of a treaty are interpreted “in their context,” which includes
the text, its preamble, and annexes.  The context of a treaty also includes
“any relevant rule of international law applicable in the relations between
the parties.”91
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92. CAFTA Preamble.
93. Vienna Convention, supra note 90, Article 32.
94. MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 78, at 46-47.
The Preamble section of the CAFTA text states:
[The Parties Resolve to]:  
. . . 
Implement this Agreement in a manner consistent with
environmental protection and conservation, promote sustainable
development, and strengthen their cooperation on environmental
matters;
Protect and preserve the environment and enhance the means for
doing so, including through the conservation of natural resources
in their respective territories;
Preserve their flexibility to safeguard the public welfare; . . . .92
The offensive use of direct and indirect expropriation would clearly
contradict an implementation of CAFTA that is “in a manner consistent
with environmental protection and conservation,” and such an interpretation
would hinder a state’s “flexibility to safeguard the public welfare.”  Such
an interpretation would also counter the polluter pays principle, which is a
“relevant rule of international law.”  
Assuming that Article thirty-one leaves the meaning of expropriate
ambiguous, Article thirty-two, “Supplementary means of interpretation,”
provides guidance:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation,
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances
of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from
the application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning when the
interpretation according to Article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreason-
able.93
It could be argued that allowing the concept of expropriation to limit the
legitimate regulatory power of a government, along with the potential
inversion of the “polluter pays” principle, would constitute an “absurd or
unreasonable” result.  Such an interpretation would run counter to the
promotion of sustainable development and would weaken the development
and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations.94
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95. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 712.
96. Id. at cmt. g. 
97. These arbitrations were “the most extensive set of international investor-state
arbitrations ever undertaken . . . .  [They] followed the overthrow of the Shah of Iran by the
Islamic Government in 1979, an event which resulted in claims for property losses from both
American investors in Iran and Iranian investors in the United States.”  MANN & VON
MOLTKE, supra note 78, at 40.
The application of the IUSCT to NAFTA cases has proven controversial.  One
NAFTA tribunal expressly rejected such use precedent because “[the IUSCT’s] mandate
expressly extends beyond expropriation to include other measures affecting property rights.”
Turk, supra note 78, at 59 (internal citations omitted).  However, the cautious use of
precedent stemming from the IUSCT decisions can be defended: “[t]hat tribunal rendered
final decisions in a large number of cases, many of which include facts that could be
analogized to potential NAFTA disputes.  Failure to consider the experiences of that tribunal
only results in increased uncertainty for both investors and states under the relatively new
NAFTA scheme.”  Id. at 59-60.
The Restatement provides that a government must normally pay
compensation for expropriating property,95 but comment g holds that a state
need not pay compensation for: 
[L]oss of property or for other economic disadvantage resulting
from bona fide general taxation, regulation, forfeiture for crime, or
other action of the kind that is commonly accepted as within the
police power of states, if it is not discriminatory . . . and is not
designed to cause the alien to abandon the property to the state or
sell it at a distress price.96
The idea of an exception for legitimate regulation is supported by the
general concept of a state’s police powers.  
This analysis is supported by a review of the international investor-state
arbitrations created by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (IUSCT).97
One veteran international arbitrator reached the following set of conclusions
on the state of law regarding expropriation coming from this Tribunal:
1.  The Tribunal has been concerned to ensure that property rights
are respected and that compensation is paid when the alien owner
of those rights is deprived of them by acts attributable to a state.
2. Liability exists whenever acts attributable to a state have
deprived an alien owner of property rights of value to him,
regardless of whether the state has thereby obtained anything of
value to it.
3. Liability is not affected by the intent or absence of intent
attributable to the state.
292 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:2
98. Timothy Wilson, Trade Rules: Ethyl Corporation v. Canada (NAFTA Chapter 11)
Part II: Are Fears Founded?, 6 NAFTA L. & BUS. REV. AM. 205, 222 (2000) (citing George
Aldrich, What Constitutes a Compensable Taking of Property?  The Decisions of the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal, 88 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 585, 609 (1994)) (emphasis added).
99. Kevin Banks, NAFTA’s Article 1110- Can Regulation be Expropriation?, 5 NAFTA
L. & BUS. REV. AM. 499, 515 (1999).
100. Id. at 515-16 (internal quotations omitted).
101. Id. at 516.
4.  Liability does not require the transfer of title to the property.
5.  Liability does not arise from actions that are non-discriminatory
and are within the commonly accepted taxation and police powers
of states.
6.  Liability is not affected by the fact that the state has acted for
legitimate economic or social reasons and in accordance with its
laws.98 
The issue is how to draw a line between an action that indirectly
expropriates a covered investment, thus requiring compensation under
Article 10.7.1, and a measure that is within the “commonly accepted . . .
police powers of states.”  The IUSCT does provide some useful points of
reference; the IUSCT’s definition of expropriation can be seen as
“establishing at least an outer bound for the definition of the term.”99  The
IUSCT utilized five different definitions of expropriation: 
a compulsory transfer of property rights[,] . . . an unreasonable
interference test[,] . . . interference to such an extent that the
property rights are rendered so useless that they must be deemed to
have been expropriated[,] . . . non-ephemeral deprivation of the
fundamental rights of ownership[,] . . . [and] whether the effective
use of the property has been lost.100 Taken together, these
formulations suggest that, for there to be a compensable taking,
there must be a sufficient degree of interference with the most
important rights of ownership for that interference to be equivalent
to a transfer of the property . . . . [T]he concept of a “compensable
taking” used by the Tribunal arguably constitutes an outer bound
for the definitions of “indirect expropriation” . . . .101
The specific issue of interpretation is whether the three factors listed in
Annex 10-C (4)(a) (economic impact, interference with distinct, reasonable
investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government
action) provide a certain enough framework to fall within the outer
boundary established by the IUSCT.  
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102. For example, the fear of having to pay compensation to a foreign investor could
prevent a country from creating a MPA that could protect an extremely vulnerable area of
marine habitat in the region.
103. An analysis of NAFTA is critical in forecasting the impact of CAFTA:
At the very least, the legal and institutional issues raised by the early [NAFTA]
Chapter 11 jurisprudence demand a radical reconsideration of the underlying model
before it is imported wholesale into . . . other agreements.  At stake is nothing less
than the integrity of the democratic process and states’ ability to regulate effectively
for the preservation of public health and the natural environment.
Beauvais, supra note 83, at 296.
104. NAFTA art. 1110(1).  The relevant compensation language is:  “[c]ompensation shall
be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment immediately before the
expropriation took place . . . .” Id. art. 1110(2).
A synthesis of the various interpretations of indirect expropriation
discussed above could result in a compelling argument that a legitimate
environmental regulation should never be considered to be an indirect
expropriation.  While this type of analysis is an interesting academic
exercise, the more pragmatic issue is whether the uncertainty of what
constitutes an acceptable state regulation could have a direct impact on
creating effective environmental and other public policy laws among the
CAFTA signatory countries.102
C.  An Additional Source of Interpretation: An Examination of 
NAFTA’s Expropriation Language
Determining the boundaries of indirect expropriation has been an
ongoing process throughout the ten years of NAFTA interpretation.  An
assessment of that process can shed some light on the potential impact of
Article 10.7.1 of CAFTA.103  
One means of forecasting the impact of CAFTA’s Article 10.7.1 is to
examine the interpretation of NAFTA’s similar Article 1110(1):
No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an
investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a
measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an
investment (“expropriation”), except: 
(a) for a public purpose;
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis;
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1);
and
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs
2 through 6.104
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105. Id. at Preamble.  
106. Banks, supra note 99, at 511, n.64 (emphasis in original).  CAFTA contains similar
modifying language regarding the implementation of environmental regulations.  See supra,
notes 75 and 76 and accompanying text.
Under both NAFTA and CAFTA, legislation that is determined to
directly or indirectly expropriate an investment, even if it is for a public
purpose, is only allowable in conjunction with a payment of compensation.
The Preamble to NAFTA states that the parties resolved to “contribute to
the harmonious development and expansion of world trade . . . in a manner
consistent with the environmental protection and conservation; . . . [to
promote] sustainable development; . . . [and to strengthen] the development
and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations.”105  However, this
language is further modified by provisions within NAFTA that highlight the
uncertainty surrounding when a legitimate public policy goal might be
considered an expropriation:
Article 1101(4) commands those interpreting chapter 11 to not
construe it so as to prevent a party from providing a range of public
services (such as policing or social welfare) “in a manner that is not
inconsistent” with that chapter.  This wording seems to allow
interpretations of chapter 11 that prevent a party from providing
those services in a manner that is inconsistent with the chapter.  It
also suggests, without providing more information, that in some
circumstances such services could be provided in a way that is
inconsistent with chapter 11.  Similarly, article 1114(1) provides
that nothing in chapter 11 shall be construed to prevent a party
from adopting any environmental measure otherwise consistent
with that chapter.  The net effect of the “otherwise consistent”
qualifier in article 1114(1) is to indicate that an environmental
measure will not necessarily comply with chapter 11 simply by
virtue of being an environmental measure.106  
The same ambiguity regarding the interpretation of indirect expropriation
exists in NAFTA and CAFTA; an examination of the actual interpretation
undertaken by NAFTA tribunals shifts this analysis from the theoretical to
the practical by creating a functional definition.
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107. Wagner, supra note 84, at 488-89.
1.  Metalclad Corporation v. Mexico
The facts of the case are as follows:
In 1995, the Mexican federal government authorized Quimica
Omega de Mexico, a subsidiary of the US-based Metalclad
Corporation, to take over and operate a toxic waste facility in the
Mexican state of San Luis Potosi.  The facility had a history of
contaminating local groundwater.  Metalclad reportedly spent $22
million preparing the facility.
From before the outset of this project, Metalclad was aware that
its “proposed business in Mexico is highly regulated and is subject
to Mexican Environmental law.”  This law regulates both the
construction and operation of hazardous waste facilities, and
requires environmental impact studies and permits from the
National Institute of Ecology (INE), as well as local and state
agencies.  Operation of such facilities and compliance with INE
regulations is subject to continual monitoring by the Federal
Attorney for the Protection of the Environment.
Environmentalists and local citizens were not satisfied with the
environmental impact assessment for the facility, and successfully
pressed the local government not to permit its operation.  In late
1996, the Governor of San Luis Potosi deemed the facility to be an
environmental hazard to surrounding communities and ordered the
Metalclad waste facility shut down.  The Governor’s decision was
supported by a geological audit performed by environmental
impact analysts at the University of San Luis Potosi, who found
that the facility was located on an underground alluvial stream and
could therefore contaminate the local water supply.  The Governor
subsequently declared the site part of a 600,000 acre ecological
zone.107
As a result of this government action, Metalclad filed a claim under the
NAFTA investment chapter, alleging that, “having been denied the right to
operate its constructed and permitted facility, its property has therefore
been, as a practical matter, expropriated, entitling the Company to the fair
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108. Id. at 489-90.  The Notice of Intent was filed on December 30, 1996, and the Notice
of Arbitration was filed on January 2, 1997.  The Final Award was announced September
2, 2000.  Metalclad also claimed a violation of Article 1105-Fair and Equitable Treatment;
the Tribunal found that Metalclad was not treated fairly or equitably under the NAFTA and
therefore succeeded on its claim under Article 1105.  A procedural review of the case is
available at NAFTA Claims, http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes_mexico_metalclad.htm
(last visited Feb. 11, 2007).
109. Wagner, supra note 84, at 490.
110. The Tribunal stated that:
A Tribunal established pursuant to NAFTA Chapter Eleven, Section B must decide
the issues in dispute in accordance with NAFTA and applicable rules of international
law. (NAFTA Article 1131(1)). In addition, NAFTA Article 102(2) provides that the
Agreement must be interpreted and applied in the light of its stated objectives and in
accordance with applicable rules of international law. These objectives specifically
include transparency and the substantial increase in investment opportunities in the
territories of the Parties. (NAFTA Article 102(1)(c)). The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, Article 31(1) provides that a treaty is to be interpreted in good faith
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of the treaty’s object and purpose. The context for the purpose
of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its
preamble and annexes, any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between
all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty. (Id., Article 31(2)(a)).
There shall also be taken into account, together with the context, any relevant rules
of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. (Id., Article 31(3)).
Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them
in good faith. (Id., Article 26). A State party to a treaty may not invoke the provisions
of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform the treaty. (Id., Article 27).
Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes, Final Award of the Tribunal, ¶ 70 (Aug. 30, 2000), available at
http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes_mexico_metalclad.htm (follow “Final Award”
hyperlink).
111. Id. at ¶ 103.
market value of the facility as damages.”108  Metalclad claimed “that the
facility was worth ninety million dollars.”109
The Tribunal laid out the applicable law,110 and gave their interpretation
of what constitutes an expropriation:  
[E]xpropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate
and acknowledged takings of property, such as outright seizure or
formal or obligatory transfer of title in favour of the host State, but
also covert or incidental interference with the use of property which
has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant
part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of
property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host
State.111
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112. Id. at ¶ 106.
113. Id. at ¶ 112.
114. HOWARD MANN, THE FINAL DECISION IN METHANEX V. UNITED STATES: SOME NEW
WINE IN SOME NEW BOTTLES 2 (2005).  The Methanex claim has been described as
The Municipality’s actions were deemed to be an expropriation.  The
Tribunal reasoned that the denial of a permit to construct the landfill was
based upon “the adverse environmental effects of the hazardous waste
landfill and the geological unsuitability of the landfill site,” as opposed to
any “proposed physical construction or any defect in the site.”112  As a
result, the Tribunal held that “Mexico has indirectly expropriated
Metalclad’s investment without providing compensation to Metalclad for
the expropriation.  Mexico has violated Article 1110 of the NAFTA.”113
2.  Methanex v. United States
The facts of the case are as follows:
The Methanex case is an investment dispute between Canadian-
based Methanex Corporation and the United States, arising from
the provisions in the North American Free Trade Agreement’s
Chapter 11 on investment.  Methanex is a major producer of
methanol, a key component of MTBE (methyl tertiary butyl ether),
which is used to increase oxygen content and act as an octane
enhancer in unleaded gasoline.  Methanex launched its international
arbitration against the United States in response to the March 1999
order by the State of California to ban the use of MTBE by the end
of 2002.
California argued that banning MTBE was necessary because
the additive is contaminating drinking water supplies, and is
therefore posing a significant risk to human health and safety, and
the environment.  Methanex argued in its original submission that
the ineffective regulation and non-enforcement of domestic
environmental laws, including the U.S. Clean Water Act, is
responsible for the presence of MTBE in California water supplies.
The company argued that the ban is tantamount to an expropriation
of the company’s investment and thus a violation of NAFTA’s
Article 1110; was enacted in breach of the national treatment
obligation in Article 1102 of NAFTA; and was also in breach of the
minimum international standards of treatment obligations in Article
1105 of NAFTA.  It was seeking almost $1 billion in compensation
from the United States.114
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“probably the largest single takings case in U.S. history.”  Beauvais, supra note 83, at 245.
115. MANN, supra note 114, at 6.
116. Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, In the Matter of an Arbitration
under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules, Final Award of the Tribunal, Part IV, Chapter D, ¶ 7, (Aug. 7, 2005),
available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes_us_6.htm (follow “Final Award”
hyperlink).  
117. Id. at ¶ 15.  
118. NAFTA art. 1136(1).  “An award made by a Tribunal shall have no binding force
except between the disputing parties and in respect of the particular case.”  Article 10.26.4
of CAFTA contains identical language.
119. For example, would new scientific information violate the “specific commitment”
provision or would it be considered a “fundamental change in circumstances” and thereby
not trigger the expropriation language?  MANN, supra note 114, at 8.  
Similar to the Metaclad complaint, Methanex’s argument focused on
the economic impact of the regulatory measure.  The Tribunal, however,
focused on the role of a state’s traditional police powers.115  The Tribunal
explained the distinction between legitimate regulations and prohibited
measures that constitute expropriation:
In the Tribunal’s view, Methanex is correct that an intentionally
discriminatory regulation against a foreign investor fulfils a key
requirement for establishing expropriation.  But as a matter of
general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a
public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process
and, which affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is
not deemed expropriatory and compensable unless specific
commitments had been given by the regulating government to the
then putative foreign investor contemplating investment that the
government would refrain from such regulation.116 
The Tribunal then held that, “[f]rom the standpoint of international law, the
Californian ban was a lawful regulation and not an expropriation.”117  The
Tribunal’s formula—that a regulatory measure created for a non-
discriminatory, public purpose, and enacted in accordance with due process
is not an expropriation—cannot be used as a certain test in all future cases.
First, the decision in one NAFTA case does not bind other Tribunals.118
Second, the phrase “unless specific commitments had been given by the
regulating government to the then putative foreign investor contemplating
investment that the government would refrain from such regulation” creates
an area of uncertainty within the holding of the Tribunal.119 
Examining the potential impact of this holding on CAFTA highlights
additional uncertainties.  Annex 10-C provides that the issue of regulatory
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120. CAFTA Annex 10-C.4.  
121. MANN, supra note 114, at 9.  
122. CAFTA Annex 10-C.4.b.  
123. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL AND FRIENDS OF THE EARTH FACT SHEET,
THE THREAT TO THE ENVIRONMENT FROM THE CENTRAL AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
(CAFTA): THE CASE OF HARKEN COSTA RICA HOLDINGS AND OFFSHORE OIL 1, available
at http://www.citizenstrade.org/pdf/foe_harkenfacts_april2004.pdf.
expropriation is to be determined by three factors:  “the economic impact
of the government action, the extent of interference with distinct, reasonable
investment backed expectations, and the character of the government
action.”120  The holding of the Methanex Tribunal would directly impact the
third factor, and the “specific commitment” provision addresses the second
factor, but the decision does not address the first factor.121  The Metalclad
Tribunal used the issue of economic impact to trigger the expropriation
award.  Without further clarification, the prospect of a significant economic
impact on an investor could trigger the “except in rare circumstances”
provision of Annex 10-C.4.b and cause “nondiscriminatory regulatory
actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public
welfare objectives”122 to be considered a regulatory expropriation.  What is
certain is that the Metalclad and Methanex decisions do not provide a clear
analysis to determine what is or is not indirect expropriation.   
D.  Harken Oil: A Real Life Hypothetical
A recent challenge to a regulatory measure in Costa Rica provides an
example of the types of factual settings that will eventually define the
indirect expropriation language of CAFTA:  
Harken Costa Rica Holdings obtained a concession agreement to
drill for oil off Costa Rica’s Caribbean [coast], including the
environmentally sensitive Talamanca coast.  Drilling was contin-
gent on the outcome of an environmental assessment.  The Costa
Rican government reviewed the assessment and determined that
Harken’s application for permission to drill was incompatible with
the country’s environmental law.  In response, Harken tried to
bring an international suit against the Costa Rican government.
Harken demanded more than $57 billion in compensation, almost
three times the country’s GDP.  Under the terms of the contractual
agreement, however, the Government exercised its right to keep the
case in Costa Rica before accepting international arbitration.123
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124. Id. at 2.  The Talamanca coast contains key sea turtle breeding areas for the
Hawksbill, Great-headed and endangered Leatherback, and Green Turtles. The population
of green turtles in the area is the largest in the western hemisphere, and the Leatherback
population has been increasing in numbers at an unprecedented rate since the protected area
has been enforced.  Id.
125. Id. “Harken decided not to appeal the decision made by Costa Rica’s Environmental
Authority.”  Id. (internal citation omitted).   
126. Steven J. Barry, Oil Controversy Heats Up, TICO TIMES, Aug. 20, 2004, available
at http://www.ticotimes.net/archive/08_20_04_nb.htm. 
127. Id.
128. MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 78, at 4.  “It is the unexpectedly broad and
aggressive use of this process to challenge public policy and public welfare measures that
has caught governments and observers off guard . . . .”  Id. 
129. Id. at 10 (quoting NOTES FOR AN ADDRESS BY THE HONOURABLE SERGIO MARCHI,
MINISTER FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE, TO THE NAFTA FIFTH ANNIVERSARY LUNCHEON
(Apr. 23, 1999), available at http://w01.international.gc.ca/MinPub/Publication.asp?
publication_id=374904&Language=E).
The Talamanca coast is an area of significant biological and economic
importance; in particular, it contains nesting sights for three species of sea
turtle.124  The permit to drill was rejected because “[Harken Oil] failed to
address concerns that oil drilling would harm critical nesting areas for
endangered turtles and coral reefs that are central to the country’s eco-
tourism economy.”125  Harken Oil disputed this finding and filed a request
for international arbitration.126  International arbitration was not mandatory,
and Harken Oil withdrew their request and entered settlement negotiations
with the Costa Rican government.127  Had CAFTA been in effect, Costa
Rica would have been bound to the holdings of an international tribunal,
and would therefore be in the position of forecasting where that particular
group of three would draw the line between legitimate police powers and
a regulatory expropriation.
IV.  CONCLUSION
The offensive use of the expropriation language within NAFTA was a
surprise,128 and the need for a distinct line regarding the expropriation
language of the agreement has been publicly acknowledged.  For example,
the Canadian Minister for International Trade stated that it was necessary
to develop a “common understanding on the investor-state provisions to
ensure that government’s ability to legislate and regulate in the public
interest is protected.”129  While the effects of Article 1110(1) might have
been a surprise in the first few years of NAFTA, the functional harm created
by this language was recognized, and yet nearly identical language was
used in CAFTA’s Article 10.7(1).  The uncertainty created by this language
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130. CAFTA Annex 10-C(4)(a).  The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative responded
to the comparisons between NAFTA and CAFTA:  “In CAFTA, labor and environment are
enforceable parts of the core trade agreement . . . CAFTA has real teeth, including binding
dispute settlement, monetary fines directed at solving problems, and potential trade
sanctions.”  OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, CAFTA RHYMES
WITH NAFTA BUT IS BETTER IN MANY WAYS (June 2005), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/Briefing_Book/asset_up
load_file133_7801.pdf.  The “real teeth” created by the “binding dispute settlement” process
is precisely the damaging language that CAFTA has adopted from NAFTA.  
131. Jones, supra note 78, at 559.
132. Poirier, supra note 84, at 913 (quoting TRADE & ENV’T POLICY ADVISORY
COMMITTEE, THE U.S. SINGAPORE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: REPORT OF THE TRADE AND
ENVIRONMENT POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE (TEPAC) 6 (2003)).  TEPAC had the
following recommendations: 
To further enlighten the appropriate development of this now more refined concept,
we urge the respective national governments to exchange soon, and in an
appropriately formal manner, exemplars of what currently constitutes such an
“indirect expropriation” in each of their respective legal regimes in order to better
inform each national perspective as to the current application of this critical concept
in the other’s jurisdiction. These exemplars should also be made available to any
empanelled arbitral panel for appropriate reference.  
Id.  “The TEPAC also stated that the ‘rare circumstances’ language could be strengthened
for greater clarity.”  Id. 
133. See generally Beauvais, supra note 83, at 287-92 (examining the pros and cons of
potential interpretive statements).   
is exacerbated by Annex 10-C, which “requires a case-by-case, fact-based
inquiry” for each “specific fact situation” to determine “whether an action
or series of actions . . . constitutes an indirect expropriation.”130  The
damaging effects of this uncertainty are intensified by the economic
disparity between many investors and Central American/Caribbean
signatories of CAFTA.  Uncertainty is built into the Agreement: the lack of
precedent, the vague language, and the requirement for case-by-case
analysis regarding indirect expropriations allow the investor protection
language to be used by investors as a sword to potentially attack needed
public policy regulations.  
The issues then are twofold: what does indirect expropriation mean and
who gets to decide?  Put differently, potential solutions to the issue of
indirect expropriations are either substantive or procedural.  Potential
substantive solutions center on creating a more illustrative definition by
changing the text of the Agreement,131 providing examples of indirect
expropriation,132 or having the parties create an interpretive statement
regarding the breadth of indirect expropriations.133  Each of these
substantive solutions could provide some context for a tribunal in making
a decision regarding an indirect expropriation and each should be pursued.
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134. Poirier, supra note 84, at 903.  
The [NAFTA] negotiators considered whether or not they ought to try to draw a
bright line in the text that would distinguish between legitimate, bona fide and
nondiscriminatory regulation, one the one hand, and an expropriatory act requiring
compensation, on the other. [They] quickly gave up that enterprise.  [They believed
that] [i]f the United States Supreme Court and arbitral tribunals could not do it in over
200 years, it was unlikely that the negotiators were going to do it in a matter of weeks
with one line in a treaty.  
Id. at 904 (internal citations omitted).
135. Jones, supra note 78, at 546.  “By instituting a preliminary examination or some kind
of screening mechanism that includes the threat of sanctions or litigation in a domestic court
against a party who brings a meritless, frivolous, or needlessly expensive suit, many . . .
arbitrations could be avoided.”  Id.
136. Poirier, supra note 84, at 919.  See also id. at 915 (discussing the requirement “that
domestic courts examine indirect expropriations claims in the first instance”).
137. Id. at 924-25.
138. CAFTA Annex 10-F.  The creation of such a body would arguably run counter to the
goal of efficiency espoused by proponents of the current NAFTA arbitration model.  To
respond, the fear of inefficiency can act as a lever to encourage investors to settle rather than
pursue a claim, arguably acting as an equalizer in the relationship between investor and
state.
In reality, however, the problem with this approach is that written
definitions are by nature inexact, and no matter how expansive a definition,
a definition still needs to be applied to a given set of facts.  The vagueness
of the Agreement reflects the current state of international law; at best,
“[t]here is some agreement at [a] very general level about international law
on expropriations in the form of regulatory takings.  The problem is how to
apply this standard.”134
Potential procedural solutions include: the use of a screening
mechanism,135 a requirement to exhaust local remedies before submitting a
claim to arbitration,136 and the use of an international appellate body.137  The
creation of an appellate body is considered within Annex 10-F of CAFTA,
which directs the initial stages of the creation of such a body after the
signatory countries implement CAFTA.138  This Comment proposes two
changes within the existing structure of CAFTA in order to procedurally
address the problematic language of Article 10.7.  First, an appellate body
should be established.  If the appellate body was created with a demand for
transparency and composed of members drawn from a pool representative
of the interests of all signatory states, then the decisions reached under
CAFTA would be legitimized in the eyes of the public and member states.
The second procedural change suggested by this Comment is also
anticipated within the current text of CAFTA.  Article 10.20.9(a) states:  
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139. CAFTA art. 10.20.9(a).
140. Poirier, supra note 84, at 883.  Arbitration and adjudication are both imperfect
mechanisms to resolve these types of conflicts:  
Choices of forum and procedure situate the dispute resolution process within one
nomos or the other. And these choices may subtly but pervasively influence the
substantive outcomes over time. The very speed, clarity, and narrowness of the
arbitration proceeding, along with its explicit lack of precedential value and of a
disciplining appellate process, undermine the dialogic and negotiation-forcing aspects
of judicial regulatory takings dispute procedures, which would typically be slower
and sometimes muddier, but certainly more public.  
Id. at 878.
In any arbitration conducted under this Section, at the request of a
disputing party, a tribunal shall, before issuing a decision or award
on liability, transmit its proposed decision or award to the disputing
parties and to the non-disputing parties.  Within 60 days after the
tribunal transmits its proposed decision or award, the disputing
parties may submit written comments to the tribunal concerning
any aspect of its proposed decision or award.  The tribunal shall
consider any such comments and issue its decision or award not
later than 45 days after the expiration of the 60-day comment
period.139
This Comment proposes a slight alteration to this portion of the text.
In the situation of a claim of indirect expropriation, the tribunal should
automatically transmit its proposed decision or award to the non-disputing
states, inviting the non-disputing states to submit written comments to the
tribunal concerning any aspect of its proposed decision or award.  Next, the
tribunal should consider the comments and make them public, along with
the decision or award.  The tribunal should also include the comments in the
record if the decision or award is appealed.  It is hoped that such procedural
modifications would combine the “procedures and opportunity for review
of the courtroom [with] the simplicity, informality, and expedition of
arbitration.”140  Conflicts involving issues of great public importance need
to be conducted in a transparent environment that fosters independence and
accountability; the current arbitration model is slanted too far in favor of
investor rights at the potential expense of legitimate public policy.   
In its present structure, CAFTA creates a framework where the mere
threat of a lawsuit has a chilling effect which acts against states
implementing new measures designed to further public policy.  The indirect
expropriation language has proven difficult to manage under NAFTA, and
two factors make that same language even more problematic in CAFTA: 1)
the lack of existing environmental laws (and other public welfare laws) in
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the majority of the member states, and 2) the fact that CAFTA will impact
the United States in very different ways than the other member countries.
Foreign investors will challenge national laws of the Dominican Republic,
Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, but these
countries will receive very little, if any, economic benefit from the investor
protection language because of the scale of their economies in comparison
to the United States economy.   
The Harken Oil case highlights the problematic position that the
signatory states will find themselves in under CAFTA.  Protecting sensitive
environmental areas such as marine ecosystems requires the enforcement
of laws that are not yet on the books.  Effective conservation measures
require multinational agreements, national environmental laws, and local
education and implementation; most importantly, these measures need to be
enforced.  The creation and enforcement of environmental regulations are
the types of state action that will be chilled by the language of Chapter Ten.
CAFTA needs to be modified to amend the uncertain language regarding
indirect expropriation and to revise the arbitration process used by private
corporations to challenge public policy measures.  
